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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 2 FALL 1974 NUMBER 4
A LOOK AT FLORIDA'S PROPOSED
CODE OF EVIDENCE
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT*
The law of evidence had been codified in three states, California,"
New Jersey 2 and Kansas, 3 prior to the United States Supreme Court's
promulgation of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.4 The sub-
mission of the rules to the Congress, and their approval, as amended,
by the House of Representatives 5 served as the catalyst for renewed
interest in evidence codification. Three states6 have recently adopted
comprehensive Rules of Evidence that closely parallel the Proposed
Federal Rules, and at least four other states, including Florida, have
drafted or are actively considering the adoption of such a codification.
7
During the 1974 session of the Florida Legislature, a comprehensive
Code of Evidence (hereinafter referred to as the Code) was intro-
* Professor of Law, Florida State University. B.S., Iowa State University, 1962;
J.D., University of Iowa, 1964. The author is Reporter to the Florida Law Revision
Council for the Proposed Florida Evidence Code. Much of the research for this article
was done while drafting the Code. The opinions, conclusions and recommendations
contained in this article are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent
or reflect the opinions, conclusions or recommendations of the Florida Law Revision
Council.
1. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1-1605 (West 1966).
2. N.J.R. EVID. 1-72 (1967). The New Jersey codification contains both statutory
enactments and rules issued by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Each section, however,
has a rule number, to which all citations to the rules will refer. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § §
2A:84A-1-49 (Supp. 1974).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -470 (1964).
4. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as PROP. FE. R. Evm.].
5. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For an excellent compilation of the ma-
terials presented during the House discussion on the Proposed Federal Rules, see Hearings
on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. See NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 4 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-101 to -1102 (Supp.
1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. chs. 901-11 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
7. See NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PRoPOSED
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR NEBRASKA (1973); Fla. H.R. 3670 (1974). The Nebraska proposal
is examined in Symposium-The Proposed Nebraska Rules of Evidence, 53 NEB. L. REv.
331-461 (1974). In hearings before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, witnesses from North Dakota and Maine testified that each state
had a proposed evidence code under consideration. See Hearings on Proposed Rules
of Evidence, supra note 5, at 185, 268,
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duced.s The Code was drafted and its adoption recommended by the
Florida Law Revision Council (hereinafter referred to as the Council).9
The proposed Code, together with any further changes made by the
Council, will be reintroduced for consideration by the 1975 Florida
Legislature.
In drafting the Code, an attempt was made to codify existing
Florida evidence law. There was also an effort to recommend new
provisions differing from the existing law when a significant improve-
ment in the law of evidence was possible. To obtain the viewpoint of
the practicing attorney, copies of the Preliminary Working Drafts0
were distributed to the bench and bar for comment and criticism.
Many of the suggested changes were made by the Council's drafting
committee and by the Council itself prior to submission of the Code
to the legislature.
Adoption of the Code would ease the research burden upon
lawyers and judges by providing, in statutory form, the basic rules
of evidence; its adoption would also ensure uniformity in the applica-
tion of the rules of evidence in the various courts throughout the state.
In addition, the Code provides certainty and stability in those areas
where the law is unclear because of a paucity of decisions or conflict
among them.
Although the Code's sectional organization is similar to the Pro-
posed Federal Rules, various sections differ more significantly in sub-
8. The proposed Code was introduced in both the Florida House of Representatives,
see Fla. H.R. 3670 (1974), and Senate, see Fla. S. 1039 (1974), on the last day for filing
bills in the 1974 Session and no consideration was given to it, either in committee or
on the floor. The Code will be cited throughout this article as PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE
together with the appropriate section number from the House bill. The reader should
be alerted that if and when the code is enacted, there may be significant changes in
the numbering of the sections.
9. The Florida Law Revision Council has the statutorily imposed duty to:
(1) Examine the common law, constitution and statutes of the state and current
judicial decisions for the purpose of discovering defects and anachronisms in the
law and recommending needed reforms;
(2) Recommend, from time to time, such changes in the law as it deems proper
to modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring
the law of the state into harmony with modern conditions ....
FLA. STAT. § 13.96 (1973).
10. The Reporter's initial draft of various code sections was submitted to the
Council's drafting committee for consideration and approval. The work product of
the drafting committee was printed and distributed to the bench and bar as Pre-
liminary Working Drafts. The final changes made in the Preliminary Working Drafts
by the Law Revision Council itself were incorporated directly into the bills submitted
by the sponsors. The major provisions of the Preliminary Working Drafts are sum-
marized in Smith & Ehrhardt, Proposed Code of Evidence, 48 FLA. B.J. 13 (1974). Copies
of the Preliminary Working Drafts are on file with both the Council and the Florida
State University Law Library, Tallahassee, Florida.
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stance from that model than do the codifications adopted in other
states. While most of the section numbers correspond to the number
of the federal rule that pertains to the same subject, many of the Code
provisions adopt an opposite view from the Proposed Federal Rules
and others represent minor refinements.
This article examines several of the provisions of the Code that
significantly change existing Florida law or that the author feels should
be explained in order to foster a thorough understanding of the
significance of the Code.
I. HEARSAY
The traditional rule is that hearsay statements are inadmissible as
evidence because of the inability of counsel to test the credibility of
the statement by cross-examination of the declarant under oath.", When
the circumstances surrounding a hearsay statement indicate a cir-
cumstantial probability of reliability-usually a lack of motive by the
declarant to falsify-an exception to the hearsay rule is recognized.12
The Code defines hearsay as a "statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted."'3 "Statement" is defined to
include nonverbal assertive conduct.' 4 Thus, if a person nods his head
indicating his response to a question calling for a "yes" or "no" answer,
that conduct is intended as an assertion of fact and is included in the
definition of hearsay. But if there was other conduct, such as leaving
a room by way of a door, which was not intended by the person to
indicate a method of leaving the room, it is not an assertion and is not
hearsay; its admissibility is governed by the other exclusionary rules
of evidence, principally the rule regarding relevancy.'
5
11. See 5 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). For a good discussion of
other reasons justifying the exclusion of hearsay evidence, see C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §
245 (2d ed. 1972).
12. See Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA. L. REV. 271, 280 (1952).
13. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.801(5). See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ganz,
119 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1960); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972).
The definition of hearsay is the same as that in PROP. FED. R. EVID. 801, which is dis-
cussed at length and compared to existing Florida law in Ladd, Some Highlights of the
New Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 192-214 (1973).
14. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.801(l)(b).
15. The Code excludes from its definition of hearsay nonverbal conduct from which
the inference sought to be proved may be drawn. PROP. FLA. EID. CODE § 90.801. Al.
though some courts and scholars argue that, in effect, the inference from such conduct
is an assertion and properly includable as hearsay, see, e.g., Finman, Implied Assertions
as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REv. 682
(1962); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HAuv.
L. RE v. 177, 214, 217 (1948), the Code adopts the philosophy of California, see CAL. EvID.
1974]
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The Code recognizes twenty-seven types of out-of-court statements
that have sufficient circumstantial probability of reliability to be
recognized as exceptions to the hearsay rule.16 Under section 803 of
the Code, twenty-three exceptions exist regardless of whether the per-
son making the statement is available as a witness. 7 Four exceptions
that do not possess as great a circumstantial probability of reliability
are recognized only when the declarant is unable to testify during the
trial.'8 When the declarant is unavailable and the only method of bring-
ing a statement before the trier of fact is through proof of the out-of-
court statement, an exception to the general exclusionary rule is pro-
vided. 19 Under the Code, "unavailability" occurs when: (1) the court
has sustained the declarant's claim of privilege relating to the subject
matter of the statement;20 (2) the declarant refuses to testify concern-
ing the matter although the court orders him to do so6 21 or the de-
clarant suffers "a lack of memory of the subject matter.., as to destroy
his effectiveness as a witness .. .";22 (3) death or physical or mental
infirmity prevents the declarant from testifying at the trial; 28 or (4)
CODE §§ 225, 1200 (West 1966), and New Jersey, see N.J.R. EVID. 62(1) (1967), as well
as that of the Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 801. The Advisory Committee's note
to the federal rule states:
Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect to the perception,
memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisory
Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent
to assert and do not justify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class
of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with
nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. The situations giving rise to the
nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate questions of sincerity. Moti-
vation, the nature of the conduct, and the presence or absence of reliance will bear
heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence. Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule
as a "See-Do" Rule: Evidence of Conduct, 33 Rocky Mt.L.Rev. 133 (1961). Similar
considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal conduct which is
assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter as-
serted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay ....
16. See PROP. FLA. EviD. CODE §§ 90.803-04.
17. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803.
18. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CoDE § 90.804(2).
19. If the proponent of the hearsay is responsible for the unavailability of the de-
clarant, the declarant is then not "unavailable" under the Code. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE
§ 90.804(1). See CAL. EvID. CODE § 240 (West 1966); PROP. FED. R. EvID. 804(a). C.
MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 253 (2d ed. 1972), contains a thorough discussion of unavailability
and hearsay exceptions.
20. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.804(l)(a).
21. PROP. FLA. Evw. CODE § 90.804(l)(b).
22. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.804(l)(c). See Anderson v. Gaither, 162 So. 877 (Fla.
1935).
23. PRop. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.804(l)(d). See James v. State, 254 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (recognizes death as unavailability under former-testimony excep-
tion).
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the proponent of the declarant's testimony is "unable to procure the
attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means." 2'
A. Prior Inconsistent Statements
The Code adopts the view of the California Code of Evidence, 5
which allows the use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements as sub-
stantive evidence of the facts contained in the statement. Such state-
ments are excluded from the definition of hearsay when the prior state-
ment was made by a declarant who testifies at the trial and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the prior statements. 2 The Code al-
lows these prior inconsistent statements to be used for both the im-
peachment of the witness's credibility27 and for affirmative proof of
the substantive matter contained in the statement itself.
Generally, prior inconsistent statements have been used to attack
the credibility of a witness by showing that he made an earlier state-
ment inconsistent with his testimony at the trial.28 In an old decision29
the Florida Supreme Court held that inconsistent statements may be
used to attack the credibility of a witness, but "they are not evidence
to prove a fact not otherwise shown."80 In 1972 the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal in Wallace v. Rashkowsl -apparently the first
appellate decision on the issue since 1911-interpreted the prior su-
preme court opinion as applicable solely to situations in which the
only proof of the facts contained in the inconsistent statement is the
prior statement itself:
While the . . . [supreme court opinion] is by no means illuminat-
ing on the legal issue involved, it appears to assert certain qualifying
language to the general rule. That language is the last three words
of the quoted phrase, to wit: "not otherwise shown." In the decisions
24. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.804(1)(e). See Putnal v. State, 47 So. 864 (Fla. 1908)
(recognizes unknown whereabouts of declarant as unavailability under former-testimony
exception). The drafters recognized the vagueness of the language "other reasonable
means" but were unable to substitute a more precise qualification. The provision of
the PROP. FED. R. Evw. 804(a)(5) was retained and included in the Florida Code.
25. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). See also PROP. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(1). The
constitutionality of the California provision was upheld in California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149 (1970).
26. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.801(4)(a). See generally Ladd, Some Highlights of the
New Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 197-203 (1973).
27. PROP. FLA. EvIo. CODE § 90.608(l)(a).
28. See Wingate v. New Deal Cab Co., 217 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969)
(construing FLA. STAT. § 90.10 (1969)); People v. Tate, 197 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 1964).
29. Tomlinson v. Peninsular Naval Stores Co., 55 So. 548 (Fla. 1911).
30. Id.
31. 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
1974]
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cited by the appellant, each involve [sic] a prior extrajudicial state-
ment which is the only evidence contrary to that offered by the ap-
pealing party. In this case, there is considerable testimony of the
witnesses and parties, exclusive of the extrajudicial statement, upon
which the jury could find that Wallace was contributorily negligent.
In other words, the extrajudicial statement in this case would ap-
pear to be admissible under the qualifying language of the . . .
[supreme court] decision.32
In most cases, the facts sought to be proved by the prior statement
would be corroborated by other evidence and the prior statement
would be admissible. The Code expands the Wallace decision by
eliminating the requirement of the corroborating proof of the fact
sought to be proved.
Since the major reason for excluding hearsay is the lack of op-
portunity to test the truth of the statement by cross-examination of the
declarant under oath, 33 when the declarant testifies in court and is sub-
ject to cross-examination the justification for exclusion disappears. The
witness must be confronted with the statement and given the op-
portunity to explain or deny it.34 If the witness admits making the
statement, further inquiry must cease; 35 but if the witness denies mak-
ing the statement, independent evidence of the statement may be
offered. If the statement is admissible only for impeachment, as was
formerly the case, the jury is generally instructed as to the limited pur-
pose for which the evidence was offered.3 6 It is unrealistic, however,
32. Id. at 744-45.
33. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
34. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.614 provides:
(1) EXAMINING WITNESS CONCERNING PRIOR STATEMENT.-When
a witness is examined concerning his prior written statement, or oral statement
which has been reduced to writing, the court shall, upon request, order that the
statement be shown the witness or its contents disclosed to him.
(2) EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT OF
WITNESS.-Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is
inadmissible unless the witness is first afforded an opportunity to explain or deny
the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him
thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This subsection is not ap-
plicable to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Section 90.801 (d) (2).
35. Although the Code does not specifically provide that a witness may not be
further examined regarding a prior inconsistent statement that he admits making, the
drafters did not intend to change the rule prohibiting such examination as it presently
exists in FLA. STAT. § 90.10 (1973). The Code recognizes that when the prior statement
is first discovered, the witness may be unavailable. An exception is included to permit
the court, in its discretion, to allow the use of the prior statement without first question-
ing the witness about it. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.614(2). See CAL. Evm. CODE § 770
(West 1966); N.J.R. EvID. 22(b) (1967).
36. See Bartley v. United States, 319 F.2d 717, 719-20 (D.C. Cir. 1963); THE SuPREME
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to believe that a jury will consider the evidence only for purposes of
judging the credibility of a witness. Instead, if it believes the prior
statement is truthful, it will base its findings of fact thereon. The Code
recognizes that reality and excludes from the definition of hearsay prior
inconsistent statements once the witness has testified and has been sub-
jected to cross-examination. 37
B. Dying Declaration
Traditionally, dying declarations have been admissible in homi-
cide cases when they concern the cause of the declarant's death and are
made when the declarant is in fear of immediate, impending death.38
Justification for the use of dying declarations has generally been that
a person's awe of impending death is sufficiently strong to provide
the circumstantial guarantee of the statement's reliability.39 Assuming
the logic of this justification, there is no reason why a dying declara-
tion should be limited to homicide cases, provided that the declarant
has the same fear of imminent death when he makes an out-of-court
statement. In addition, whether the declarant actually dies should be
immaterial to the statement's admissibility; it is the declarant's state
of mind at the time the statement is made that provides the circum-
stantial guarantee of reliability. Thus, the Code recognizes the ad-
missibility of all declarations made under fear or belief of impending
death.40
COURT COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, FLORIDA STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 2.12(e)(1) (1970).
37. As Dean Ladd stated in Ladd, Some Highlights of the New Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 191, 200 (1973):
The . . . rule is sound in reason and is practical and realistic. The witness who
perceived the events in issue is present in court and has given testimony of those
events under oath. If he admits making the inconsistent statement, he has the
opportunity to explain it. If his explanation is not acceptable to the triers of fact,
they may use what he admitted to be a prior inconsistent statement to discredit
his testimony. If the triers of fact believed the witness spoke the truth in the
prior statement that he admitted making, it is not reasonable to expect the
triers to limit its use to credibility in their decision-making process regardless of
a court's instruction that it may be used to discredit but not to prove. The mental
gymnastics required to articulate and segregate the use of prior statements for
impeachment purposes only makes the limitation rule a formalistic fiction in dis-
regard of realism.
38. See Johnson v. State, 58 So. 540 (Fla. 1912); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 282 (2d
ed. 1972).
39. See Coatney v. State, 55 So. 285 (Fla. 1911).
40. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.804(2)(b) provides:
The following are not excluded by . . . [the hearsay rule] if the declarant is un-
available as a witness:
(b) Statement under belief of impending death.-A statement made by a de-
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In order that a statement be admissible it is not necessary that the
declarant actually be dead; it is sufficient if he is "unavailable" as de-
fined in the Code.4'1 For example, in a negligence action, if a declarant
is physically or mentally unable to testify at the time of trial, his
"dying declaration" regarding the cause of what he believed to be his
impending death is admissible. If the declarant recovers, however, and
is available to testify, the "dying declaration" is excluded as hearsay.
C. Former Testimony
Recorded testimony given by a witness during a deposition or trial
is sometimes offered during a subsequent proceeding as substantive
proof of the facts stated therein. Even though the former testimony
was given under oath and the witness was subject to cross-examination,
it is hearsay because it was not made during the instant proceeding
and is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Most jurisdictions provide an exception to the hearsay rule for
"former testimony."42 The Code recognizes differing needs and justi-
fications for the admission of this testimony in designating three
different former-testimony exceptions. First, under section 90.803(23),
testimony given by a witness at a civil trial is admissible when it is in-
troduced at a subsequent civil trial involving substantially the same
parties and issues as did the first trial. 43 Thus, in a retrial of a civil
action, it is unnecessary to call as a witness an investigating police
officer who testified during the first trial. The party offering the testi-
mony, however, is not prohibited from calling the witness. The ap-
plicability of the section is strictly limited to successive civil trials, so
that testimony offered in a criminal trial or taken during a discovery
deposition would be inadmissible under this section. There appears
to be no reason, other than a possible tactical consideration, to call the
clarant while reasonably believing that his death was imminent, concerning the
physical cause or instrumentalities of what he believed to be his impending
death.
41. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.804(2)(b).
42. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1290 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. § 92.22 (1973); N.J.R.
EvID. 63(3) (1967).
43. PROP. FLA. Evu. CODE § 90.803 provides in part:
Hearsay exceptions: availability of declarant immaterial.-The following are not
inadmissible under . . . [the hearsay rule], even though the declarant is available
as a witness:
(23) FORMER TESTIMONY.-Testimony given by declarant at a civil trial,
when used at a subsequent civil trial involving substantially the same parties and
issues.
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ordinary witness in a civil trial to testify a second time if the party
offering the testimony does not so desire.
When an offer of former testimony is made in a proceeding or a
trial other than a retrial of a civil action, the testimony will be excluded
as hearsay unless it qualifies under one of the section 90.804 exceptions,
which require that the witness be unavailable to testify. When testi-
mony was given in a different proceeding which (1) involved sub-
stantially the same issues as the present proceeding, and (2) is intro-
duced at the instance of or against a party who had the opportunity
to develop the testimony by direct, cross- or redirect examination and
had a motive and interest similar to those of the party against whom
it is now offered, the testimony is admissible under section 90.804(2) as
an exception to the hearsay rule.44 Thus, the testimony may be offered
against a party who was not a party to the action in which the testimony
was given when the section 90.804(2) criteria are met. If the testimony
was taken by means of a deposition, it is admissible as an exception
to the hearsay rule only when the deposition is (1) the sole source of
evidence to prove an element of the offering party's prima facie case,
or (2) the offering party has indicated a need for the testimony to
properly present his case and is unable without undue hardship to
introduce substantially equivalent testimony by other means."5 Be-
cause a deposition is normally taken for discovery purposes, the nature
of the questions and the scope of the cross-examination are significant-
ly different from the testimony presented at trial. Consequently, the
Code strictly limits the admissibility of depositions taken in a prior
case to those instances of extreme necessity.
As previously stated, the most plausible reason to exclude hearsay
testimony is the lack of an opportunity to test the veracity of an out-
of-court statement by cross-examination.41 When a statement has been
tested by effective cross-examination by a person with a motive and
44. PRoP. FLA. Evw. CODE § 90.804(2)(a)(1). Through a drafting error, the statutory
provision included in the bill as introduced in the legislature was not the provision
recommended by the Council. The section should read:
1. Testimony, given as a witness at a proceeding before a court involving sub-
stantially the same issues, at the instance of or against a party who had an op-
portunity to develop the testimony by direct, cross- or redirect examination, with
motive and interest similar to those of the party against whom now offered.
Subsection 90.804(l)(c) is not applicable in determining unavailability for this
exception.
See Reporter's Tentative Draft, Hearsay § 90.804(2)(a)(1) (unpublished, 1974). As indi-
cated in the text of the above section, a witness's loss of memory does not provide a
basis of unavailability for this type of former testimony. See PRop. FIA. Evm. CODE §
90.804(l)(c).
45. PRop. FLA. EvmD. CODE § 90.804(2)(a)(1).
46. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
1974]
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interest similar to the party against whom the testimony is offered in
the present case, the reason to exclude the evidence disappears. Thus,
when former testimony has met this test, it is no longer excluded.
Strict identity of issues or identity of parties is not required when the
transcript of testimony of an unavailable witness, taken in another
proceeding, is offered in a civil trial. If the witness is available and
can testify in person, however, he must be called.
In criminal cases the former-testimony exception is more limited.
It is recognized when the testimony is offered against a party who pre-
viously offered it in his own behalf in a prior case. The former-testi-
mony exception also is recognized when the party against whom the
testimony is offered in the present case was a party to the prior pro-
ceeding in which the testimony was actually given and, during the prior
proceeding, had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the de-
clarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has during
the present proceeding.47 This provision reflects the position that a
criminal defendant should have the actual opportunity to cross-examine
a witness in order to ensure a fair trial and to meet the constitutional
requirements of the right of confrontation. Thus, if a defendant in a
criminal action was not a party to the prior criminal proceeding, the
testimony is not admissible against him even though the testimony
when offered would have been subject to cross-examination by a person
with a similar motive to cross-examine. It could be offered against the
prosecution, however, since it was party to the prior criminal action.
D. Res Gestae
Despite criticism of the use of the term "res gestae," 48 Florida
courts have consistently recognized its use in describing a number of
47. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.804(2)(a)(3) states:
This exception is applicable in criminal cases only in a situation when the
testimony is offered in evidence against a party who offered it in his own behalf
on the former occasion or against the successor in interest of such person; or the
party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or
proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which
he has at the hearing.
In Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971), the Florida Supreme Court recognized
the former-testimony exception when the testimony, which was offered during a criminal
trial, was given during a preliminary hearing and the defendant's counsel had been given
the opportunity to cross-examine. The Code goes beyond Richardson by providing that
certain testimony is admissible against the prosecution and against a defendant who
previously offered it in his own behalf. See generally C. McCoR MicK, Evmr_'cE §§ 254-61
(2d ed. 1972).
48. The court in Williams v. State, 188 So. 2d 320, 323 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1966),
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different exceptions to the hearsay rule.49 It has also been used, how-
ever, as the basis for the admission of evidence that has nothing to do
with hearsay.50 For example, in a murder prosecution, the clothes that
the victim wore at the time of the murder were admitted as part of
the res gestae. 15 Under the Code, a court, rather than invoke the am-
biguous term "res gestae," would determine the admissibility of this
evidence on the basis of relevancy and would not rely on a hearsay
concept. The Code does not use the term "res gestae"; the exceptions
that have traditionally been included under it are separately recog-
nized.
(1) Spontaneous Statements and
Excited Utterances
If out-of-court statements were made spontaneously in reaction to
a stimulus, there is little likelihood that the declarant had the motive
or opportunity to falsify since the statements were made before the
opportunity to falsify arose. The Code recognizes the circumstantial
probability of reliability of these statements in the "spontaneous state-
modified, 198 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1967), quoted with approval the following passage from 6 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1767 (3d ed. 1940):
The phrase "res gestae" has long been not only entirely useless, but even positively
harmful. It is useless, because every rule of Evidence to which it has ever been
applied exists as a part of some other well established principle and can be ex-
plained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it
invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to
the limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious
element in our legal phraseology. No rule of Evidence can be created or applied by
the mere muttering of a shibboleth.
See Green v. State, 113 So. 121, 123 (Fla. 1927); C. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 288 (2d ed.
1972).
49. Professor Morgan described the different meanings possessed by the term "res
gestae":
Courts and lawyers constantly use res gestae to describe: (a) part of a relevant
transaction the offered evidence of which has no hearsay aspect, (b) declarations
of presently existing subjective symptoms offered in evidence as tending to prove
the existence of those symptoms, (c) declarations of a presently existing mental
condition offered in evidence as tending to prove that condition, its probable
continuance and its previous existence, and to prove conduct in accord with that
mental condition, (d) declarations of a past mental condition or of past symptoms,
and (e) spontaneous statements or statements made contemporaneously with a
relevant event or condition, evidence of which is offered as tending to prove the
truth of the matter stated.
Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv. 481, 568 (1946).
50. See Powell v. State, 175 So. 213 (Fla. 1937).
51. See Browne v. State, 109 So. 811, 812 (Fla. 1926).
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ment" 52 and "excited utterance"55 exceptions. When a statement is
made contemporaneously with an event and the statement explains
the event while, or immediately after, the declarant perceives it, the
Code recognizes the statement's admissibility.54 The opportunity for
the declarant to deliberately or subconsciously misrepresent what he
is seeing is quite small. If the declarant's statement does not explain
the event, it is not included within this exception. A statement by a
witness, "Look at that Chevrolet run the red light," would be ad-
missible under the spontaneous statement exception but a statement,
"Boy, the driver of the Chevrolet must have been crazy," would not
be included because it does not describe the event. In a Florida case,
an electric lineman was electrocuted while working on a wire. Testi-
mony by his assistant that the lineman had told him that he had
ordered the power turned off when he had telephoned the power
company was admitted since the court found that none of the hearsay
vices were present-there was no occasion for reflection and premedita-
tion and no motive to make the statement self-serving.55 Since there
is a possibility of fraudulent testimony being admitted under this
exception, the Code provides that the court may exclude the statement
when it is made under circumstances indicating its lack of trust-
worthiness.
The same degree of contemporaneity is not necessary if the state-
ment is made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement
caused by an event. The excited state of the declarant negates his
capacity for reflection and produces an utterance free of conscious
fabrication. If a statement relates to the event causing the excitement,
it is admissible. It is not necessary that the statement be made by a
party or that the declarant be available to testify. A statement by an
unidentified party at the scene of an automobile accident would be
52. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(1) provides:
SPONTANEOUS STATEMENT.-A spontaneous statement describing or explain-
ing an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or
condition, or immediately thereafter, except when the statement is made under
circumstances which indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
53. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.803(2) states: "EXCITED UTTERANCE.-A state-
ment relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." See generally KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(d)(1) (1964); N.J.R. EVID. 63(4) (1967); PROP. FED. R. Evm. 803(1); UNIFORM RULE
or EVIDENCE 63(4)(a).
54. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(1). See generally CAL. EvD. CODE § 1240 (West
1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(2) (1964); N.J.R. Evm. 63(4) (1967); PROP. FED. R.
Evm. 803(2); UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENcE 63(4)(b).
55. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost, 10 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1942).
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admissible under this exception when the offering party establishes
the necessary foundation .5
(2) Declarations of Mental or Physical Condition
When the state of mind of the declarant is at issue, statements
made by the declarant relating to his state of mind are admissible
to prove the state of mind.57 It is often difficult, if not impossible, to
prove an individual's state of mind without reliance upon the in-
dividual's manifestation of his feelings. Statements made by a de-
clarant, however, from which an inference of state of mind is drawn,
are not included within the exception; such statements are not hearsay
since they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 58
Rather, they are circumstantial evidence of the declarant's state of
mind and are admissible if the court finds them relevant. 59 For example,
a letter written by A to B that includes the statement "I am Julius
Caesar," when offered as proof of A's state of mind, is not hearsay and
is admissible, if relevant, to show A's lack of mental competence. It
can be inferred that A would not have stated that he was Caesar unless
he was not mentally competent. A declaration of present state of mind-
such as, "I intend to sell Blackacre to A"-when offered on the issue of
the declarant's intent is certainly offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted and is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.60
If a declaration of state of mind is not offered to prove the state of
mind, but rather to prove that the declarant acted in conformity with
previously announced intentions, the declaration is generally ad-
mitted. 1 For example, if A states: "I am going to Atlanta next week,"
the statement is admissible to prove that A, in fact, did go to Atlanta
during the week in question. If the declaration of state of mind is made
subsequent to the event, however, such as, "I went to Atlanta last
week," the Code does not include it within the exception and it is
56. See PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.803(2).
57. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(3). See Wetjen v. Williamson, 196 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 294 (2d ed. 1972).
58. See Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Slaton, 160 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968); Betts
v. Betts, 473 P.2d 403 (Wash. 1970); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1788 (3d ed. 1940). Some
courts do not recognize this distinction, and include both types of statements within a
general exception to the hearsay rule. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENE § 294 (2d ed. 1972).
59. The admissibility of the statements would be governed by the general relevancy
provisions. See PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § § 90.401-03.
60. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(3)(a).
61. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(3)(a)(2). For similar provisions, see CAL.
Evm. CODE 1250-51 (West 1966); N.J.R. EVID. 63(12) (1967); PROP. FED. R. Evm. 803(3). In
Bowen v. Keen, 17 So. 2d 706, 711 (Fla. 1944), the court adopted this view: "The rule is
quite generally recognized that the statements of a deceased person as to the purpose
and destination of a trip or journey he is about to take are admissible."
1974]
694 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.2:681
inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted.6 2 In following
the rationale of Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon,63 the Code
rejects the arguments that the need for this testimony is greater when
the declarant is unavailable and that the best evidence of whether a
person did an act is that person's statement. The Code recognizes the
ease with which an individual, once a controversy has arisen, could
manufacture favorable testimony by telling many people that certain
facts had occurred.1" If a statement of a fact that has occurred concern-
ing the making, revoking or terms of the declarant's will is offered,
the statement is specifically made admissible since these statements
may in fact be the best evidence available under the circumstances.
6 5
When statements are made by a patient for the purpose of medical
treatment, there is an inherent circumstantial probability of reliability
in the statements since the individual goes to the physician to be treated
for his illness or injury and is unlikely to have a motive to falsify.66
Therefore, these out-of-court statements, "made for the purpose of
medical diagnosis or treatment by a person seeking the diagnosis or
treatment or the person legally responsible for him,"67 are recognized
as an exception to the hearsay rule. Included in this exception are
statements made to physicians, ambulance attendants and nurses. The
compulsion to make truthful statements to members of all these groups
is similar. If the person seeking the treatment is a child, it may be
62. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.803(3)(b)(1). The Code adopts the philosophy of
Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933), in which the United States Supreme
Court refused to extend Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892), to per-
mit statements of state of mind as proof of previous happenings.
63. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
64. See generally 6 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1725-26 (3d ed. 1940); Maguire, The
Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three Years After, 39 HA~v. L. REV. 709 (1925).
65. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(3)(b)(1). The reason for this inclusion is best
stated in the Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 803:
The carving out, from the exclusion mentioned in the preceding paragraph, of
declarations relating to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of de-
clarant's will represents an ad hoc judgment which finds ample reinforcement in
the decisions, resting on practical grounds of necessity and expediency rather than
logic. McCormick § 271, pp. 577-578; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 588, 62 A.L.R.2d 855. A
similar recognition of the need for and practical value of this kind of evidence is
found in California Evidence Code § 1260.
66. See Meaney v. United States, 112 F.2d 538, 539-40 (2d Cir. 1940), where Judge
Learned Hand reasoned:
If his narrative of present symptoms is to be received as evidence of the facts, as
distinguished from mere support for the physician's opinion, these parts of it can
only rest upon his motive to disclose the truth because his treatment will in part
depend upon what he says. . . . A patient has an equal motive to speak the
truth; what he has felt in the past is as apt to be as important in his treatment
as what he feels at the moment.
67. PROP. FLA. Evm. CoDa § 90.803(4).
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necessary for a parent or member of the family to give information
regarding the child in order to supply a sufficient basis for the doctor's
treatment. Those statements are also included within the exception. 8
In the past Florida has recognized a distinction between state-
ments made to a doctor who is a "treating physician,"69 that is, one who
has been sought by the patient to treat the illness or injury, and an
"examining physician," 70 that is, one whom the patient consults only
to lay the foundation for the doctor's testimony at trial. Apparently
the Florida courts have not admitted as substantive proof statements
made to the latter on the basis that there is not the same compulsion
for the patient to be truthful since he will not be treated by the
doctor. In fact, there may be a motive to falsify in order to affect the
jury verdict. The Code, however, does not recognize this distinction.
While under existing law the examining physician cannot base his
opinion on the statements of the declarant, the doctor's testimony
nevertheless often includes the medical history that was furnished by
the patient.7'1 The jury is now instructed (albeit unrealistically) not
to give substantive effect to the statements. In addition, counsel can
avoid classifying his expert as an "examining physician" by the simple
expedient of sending the client to the doctor for a short period of
treatment prior to requesting the doctor's testimony concerning
diagnosis and prognosis. The Code avoids this essentially artificial dis-
tinction by admitting the statements of both types of doctors as sub-
stantive proof of the facts contained therein.
7 2
68. PRoP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(4), Sponsors Note at 125.
69. In Bill Kelley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kerr, 258 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1972), a treating physician was allowed to testify based on the history given by the
patient. A history would normally be set forth by the doctor prior to expressing his
opinion. Thus, while Florida courts have not expressly recognized an exception to the
hearsay rule for these statements, they have permitted them to be brought before the
jury. See Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974); C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 292-93 (2d
ed. 1972).
70. Cf. Bondy v. West, 219 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (examining
physician's opinion based, in part, upon patient's medical testimony is inadmissible).
Compare Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 162 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964), quashed
on other grounds, 178 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1965) (examining physician allowed to testify
from medical history given him by patient when opinion also based on findings of
own examination).
71. See note 69 supra.
72. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.803(4) provides:
STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR TREATMENT.
-Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment by a person
seeking the diagnosis or treatment or an individual legally responsible for the
person, which describe medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof.
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A limitation is imposed, however, and the statements admissible
under the exception cannot go beyond those of medical history, past
or present symptoms, or the inception or general character of the
cause or external source of the pain or injury.73 Thus, a statement, "I
broke my leg when a car collided with the one I was driving," is in-
cluded within the exception, while a statement, "My leg was broken
during a collision with a car that was being driven on the wrong side
of the road," is not.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The circumstances under which a witness's or party's record of
prior criminal convictions may be used in the course of a civil or
criminal trial presents a problem of more than trivial simplicity. To
analyze properly whether a conviction is admissible it is necessary to
identify the issue upon which the conviction is being introduced in
order to determine whether it is relevant. When the character of an
individual is itself an issue, such as in a libel action arising out of the
statement, "Mrs. Smith is a crook," the relevancy of evidence relating
to her criminal activity is apparent, and no specific Code provision is
included to provide for its admission.7  There are three additional
issues upon which evidence of prior criminal convictions currently
may be admitted. First, prior convictions have traditionally been used
as one of the methods to impeach the credibility of a witness testifying
at a trial. Secondly, evidence has been admitted on the issue of a
criminal defendant's motive, intent or lack of mistake. Finally, a con-
viction occasionally has been admitted in a subsequent action as proof
of a fact inherent in the conviction.
A. Convictions Used To Impeach the Credibility of a Witness
When a witness takes the stand to testify, he places in issue his
character trait of truth and veracity, and the party cross-examining the
See generally Wis. R. EvID. 908.03(4) (1973); PROP. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 266 (1954).
73. PROP. FLA. EviD. CODE § 90.803(4).
74. As Wigmore points out in his treatise, the policy reason underlying the ex-
clusion of proof of prior criminal activities lies not in the fact that it has no probative
value, but that it has too much. 1 J. WxcMoRE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940). Crimes
are excluded on the rationale that the jury will be unduly influenced by the prior acts
and thus not give clear consideration to the present charges. See also C. McCoP.micK,
EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972). If this rationale can be accepted, there is no reason to
exclude evidence of a prior conviction when it is offered as proof of an issue in dispute.
The same prejudice does not result. PROP. FED. R. EVID. 404 takes a position similar
to the Code.
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witness may introduce evidence attacking the witness's credibility. It
has been generally agreed that evidence of a witness's prior criminal
convictions is relevant to the issue of his truth and veracity.75 There
has, however, been disagreement as to which crimes are admissible
for this purpose.7 6 For example, some jurisdictions have limited the
convictions which may be used to crimes that are "felonies," 77 others
to those involving "dishonesty or false statement."' 8 Florida courts
have followed the legislative standard currently set forth in section
90.08 of the statutes, which permits evidence of the conviction "of any
crime" to be used to attack credibility.7" As long as an offense can be
classified as a "crime" the evidence has been admissible.8 0 For example,
if the witness had been previously convicted of a traffic offense outside
the city limits,"' he could be asked on cross-examination whether he
had ever been convicted of a crime. The relevancy of this evidence to
the issue of whether the witness is truthful is difficult to discern.82
75. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDEoNCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WiGMORRE, EvEN E §
980 (3d ed. 1940); 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 416 (1969).
76. At common law, conviction of a person of treason, a felony, a misdemeanor in-
volving dishonesty or obstruction of justice resulted in the convicted person's being
rendered incompetent as a witness. Later, the disqualification was removed and these
"infamous crimes" became grounds for impeaching the credibility of a witness. Un-
fortunately, just as the common law "imcompetency" provisions were imprecise, so are
the statutes defining what criminal convictions may be used for impeachment. See
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972). One view requires the trial judge to deter-
mine that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighs the dangers of unfair
prejudice prior to admitting it for impeachment purposes. See Luck v. United States,
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
77. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966); IDAHO CODE § 9-1209 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
78. See UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 21; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106.
79. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973) states:
No person shall be disqualified to testify as a witness in any court of this state by
reason of any conviction of any crime, but his testimony shall be received in
evidence under the rules, as any other testimony. Evidence of such conviction, in-
cluding the fact that the prior conviction was for the crime of perjury, may be
given to affect the credibility of the said witness, and such conviction may be
proved by questioning the proposed witness or, if he deny it, by producing a
record of his conviction. Testimony of the general reputation of said witness may
likewise be given in evidence to affect his credibility.
80. See Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1961), where the court states
that under the Florida statute "a crime is a crime." Thus, a witness may be impeached
in Florida by use of felony or misdemeanor convictions whether or not they involve
moral turpitude. Note, however, that violations of municipal ordinances are not con-
sidered to be convictions of a crime, Roe v. State, 119 So. 118 (Fla. 1928), and interroga-
tion concerning former arrests for other crimes is also improper. Jordan v. State, 144
So. 669 (Fla. 1932).
81. See Roe v. State, 119 So. 118, 121 (Fla. 1928).
82. See Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1961). The court states that it
would seem logical to limit discrediting crimes to those involving moral turpitude. See
generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EvmEc §§
980-87 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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The Code recognizes that since the evidence is being offered on
the issue of the witness's truth and veracity, the criminal conviction
should be relevant to that issue and, therefore, that admissibility
should be limited to only those crimes that involve dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of whether the witness is a disinterested third per-
son or a criminal defendant.8 3 Thus, if a witness has been convicted of
involuntary manslaughter, that conviction is not admissible on the
issue of the witness's character trait of truthfulness.
The Code also recognizes that a conviction, although it may in-
volve dishonesty or false statement, may lack probative value because
it is too remote in time.8 4 If the witness is fifty years old and has led
an exemplary life with the exception of a conviction for petty larceny
when she was twenty, it is difficult to find probative value in that
conviction on the issue of whether she is now telling the truth. 5 The
Florida courts have recognized the need for probative value in the
conviction and have generally allowed the proponent of the witness
to demonstrate on redirect the remoteness of the conviction. 6 The
Code adopts an arbitrary ten-year time limit within which the con-
viction must fall to be admissible.8 7 Without an easily ascertainable
limit, uncertainty and inconsistency in the admissibility of the
evidence in different cases results, since trial judges may differ in their
rulings on when the evidence is too remote. The Code follows exist-
ing law and bars the use of juvenile adjudications8 and allows the use
of convictions despite the pendency of an appeal."
Nothing is contained in the Code concerning the permissible pro-
cedure counsel may use in cross-examining a witness regarding his
83. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.610. Note that this position is similar to those taken
by the model codes and the new federal rules. See UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 21; MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 106; PROP. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
84. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.610(2) states: "If the witness has been released from
custody for ten years or more for his most recent conviction or from the date of his
most recent conviction, whichever is later, the crime may not be used."
85. See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43 (2d ed. 1972); Ladd, Credibility Tests
-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. Rrv. 166, 177 (1940). For similar provisions see Toms v.
State, 200 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1947) (remoteness limited by judge's discretion);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21 (1973) (exclusion for remoteness within judge's discre-
tion); PROP. FED. R. EvID. 609(b) (ten-year period).
86. See, e.g., McArthur v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1957). See generally 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1116-17 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
87. See note 84 supra.
88. See PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.610(4); FLA. STAT. §§ 39.10(3), 39.12(6) (1973).
While the Florida position follows that taken by the majority of jurisdictions, the new
federal rules adopt the Wigmore position that the admissibility of juvenile adjudica-
tions should be left to the discretion of the court. See PROP. FED. R. EVID. 609(d); 1 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 196 (3d ed. 1940).
89. See PROP. FLA. EviD. CODE § 90.610(5).
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prior convictions. Under existing law, a witness may be asked, "Have
you been convicted of any crimes?" Under the Code the question is
qualified so that the crimes referred to would be limited to those in-
volving dishonesty and false statement.90 If the witness truthfully
answers "yes," the next permissible question is, "How many times?"
If this question is correctly answered, counsel must cease his examina-
tion regarding the witness's criminal record and may not inquire fur-
ther regarding specific crimes. If the answer is not truthful, however,
the examination may continue and specific inquiry may be made into
whether the witness has been convicted of particular crimes on
particular dates.f1 Of course, if the witness correctly answers the ques-
tions regarding his prior convictions, his counsel on redirect may ex-
plore the convictions disclosed to demonstrate that they were relatively
minor or involved mitigating factors.9 2
B. Proof of Other Criminal Activity
The prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal
activity of an accused to show that he has bad character or has a pro-
pensity to commit the crime charged unless the accused first raises the
issueY3 The evidence is excluded because the prejudice that would
result from its admission far outweighs any probative value such
evidence contains.9 4
When the proof of other criminal activity is relevant to an issue
other than propensity, Florida courts have followed the rule announced
in Williams v. State9- and have found the evidence admissible:
90. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.610(1).
91. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973). McArthur v. Cook, 99 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1957), sets
forth the accepted procedure for using prior convictions to impeach.
92. 99 So. 2d at 567.
93. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.404(1)(a) provides:
(1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY.-Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of his character including a character trait is inadmissible for the purpose
of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(a) Character of Accused.-Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait.
94. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
194 (3d ed. 1940).
95. 110 So. 2d 654, 662 (Fla. 1959). This decision has been interpreted in Green v.
State, 190 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), to mean that evidence of other
offenses is admissible if:
-it is relevant and has probative value in proof of the instant case or some material
fact or facts in issue . . . and
-its sole purpose is not to show the bad character of the accused; and
-its sole purpose is not to show the propensity of the accused to commit the
instant crime charged and
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[E]vidence revealing other crimes is admissible if it casts light upon
the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, in-
tent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or
general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior
offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some es-
sential aspect of the offense being tried."6
For example, if the fraudulent intent of a criminal defendant is in
issue, it may be necessary for the prosecution to introduce similar
prior criminal acts to show the absence of a mistake in judgment and
the presence of the necessary fraudulent intent. Therefore, if a per-
son is prosecuted for larceny of a motor vehicle after renting a car
for two hours but driving it for two weeks prior to being apprehended,
the fact that the same individual had, on prior occasions, failed to
return other rented automobiles would indicate her lack of mistake
in the case at bar.9 7
In examining several appellate opinions, it becomes apparent that
evidence offered under the Williams rule is often proffered not because
the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case, but because it shows
that the defendant has a prior criminal record involving the same
type of conduct.9 The Code contains a procedure, similar to that
followed in Louisiana,99 which, it is hoped, will limit the abuses under
Williams. Section 90.404(b) provides that, in a criminal action, when
-its admission is not precluded by some other specific exception or rule of ex-
clusion.
While amounting to a significant change in Florida law at the time it was announced,
Williams was not an innovation in the area of evidence as this position was already
recognized by the legal scholars. See C. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972); 1 J.
WiRmoE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940). For an analysis of the Florida cases in this
area, see 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 197 (1974).
96. 110 So. 2d at 662.
97. It should be noted that whether this rule is stated as one of admissibility or
as an exception to a general exclusionary rule, the test remains that of relevancy, and
in most instances such evidence would be admitted since its probative value outweighs
its prejudicial effect. See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
98. In Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court
commented that the state's urging of the rule "demonstrates, we think, that which we
perceive to be a prevalent misunderstanding on the part of some trial judges and
prosecutors of the discipline of Williams .... " See, e.g., Williams v. State, 117 So. 2d
473, 476 (Fla. 1960) (court reverses on grounds that evidence of collateral crime was
so disproportionate that jury decision was not based on present crime being charged);
Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla.
1974) ("The excessive resort to evidence of other crimes is a prime source of over-
prosecution." (footnote omitted)); Christie v. State, 246 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1971) (court condemns prosecutors trying to bolster uncertain case by use of
evidence of another crime).
99. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:445-46 (1967).
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the state intends to offer proof of evidence of other crimes, it must
within a reasonable time before trial furnish the accused a written
statement of the acts or offenses that it intends to offer at the trial.
The exception to the general exclusionary rule that the state relies
upon for admissibility also must be specified. 0 ° The state must show
that the evidence it will seek to admit is not merely repetitive and
cumulative, is not a subterfuge for depicting the accused's bad
character and propensity for bad behavior, and does serve the actual
purpose for which it is offered. 10 The jury, upon request, will be
charged as to the limited purpose for which the evidence may be con-
sidered.102 Requiring written notice to the accused provides the court
an opportunity to give prior consideration to the admissibility of the
evidence and to give the defendant the opportunity to meet the issue.
It is important to note that when the court determines the ad-
missibility of proof of other criminal activity, it must determine not
only whether the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case, but also
that the prejudicial nature of the evidence does not outweigh its pro-
bative value. 0 3 Under section 90.403 of the Code, relevant evidence is
not admissible when its probative value is outweighed by unfair pre-
judice. This qualification, applicable to the admission of all evidence,
means that when evidence is admissible under a particular section of
the Code, it must also meet the standards of section 90.403.104
C. Prior Convictions as Proof of Facts Inherent Therein
When a criminal conviction is offered in a civil suit to prove the
truth of an essential fact that is inherent in the conviction, it has
traditionally been inadmissible as substantive evidence. 05 The Code
100. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.404(2)(b)(2) states: "In the written statement the
State shall specify the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies
for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses." The adoption of this
provision has been urged in Thomasson v. State, 277 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (dissenting opinion), and in both 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 197 (1974) and J. ACADEMY
FLA. TRIAL LAWYERS, April 1974, at 18. The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence do
not include such a protective provision.
101. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.404(2)(b)(3).
102. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90A04(2)(b)(4).
103. PROP. FLA. EviD. CODE § 90.403. While the Florida courts speak in somewhat
different terms, the effect they achieve is similar to the proposed provision. See Davis v.
State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974); 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 197, 202 (1974); cf. Young v. State, 234 So. 2d 341, 348 (Fla. 1970)
(evidence must be excluded if it would unduly prejudice the jury). See generally Wein-
stein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
4 GA. L. REV. 43 (1969).
104. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90A03.
105. It is an out-of-court declaration from the prior case offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the instant civil suit. See Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361
1974]
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provides an exception to the hearsay rule for prior convictions offered
to prove an essential fact contained therein 0 6 and recognizes that a
prior adjudication of criminal guilt involves a higher degree of proof
-that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt-than is required in a civil
suit. As a Kentucky court stated: "With all of the known safeguards
... thrown around a defendant in a criminal prosecution, why . ..
should a judgment convicting a litigant of a crime not create a cir-
cumstance tending to prove his guilt in a later civil action involving
the same facts? '' 10 7 For example, the prior arson conviction of a person
would be admissible during a subsequent civil suit against his insurance
company seeking the proceeds of a policy covering the building that
had burned.
Since there may be little motivation to defend charges involving
minor offenses, the Code includes in the hearsay exception only those
convictions which carry a maximum sentence of one year or more im-
prisonment. 08 Therefore, convictions for most traffic offenses are in-
admissible.
III. WITNESSES
A. Deadman's Statute
Existing Florida statutes negate the common law incompetency of
various classes of witnesses'09 and specifically disqualify only persons
covered by the Deadman's Statute. 110 Rather than specify particular
circumstances that qualify or disqualify a witness, the Code includes
a general provision that, unless otherwise provided, a witness is compe-
(Fla. 1949); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1950). It is important to distinguish the offer
of a guilty plea which is admissible as an admission by a party-opponent. See Boshnack
v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
106. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.803(22).
107. Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 140 S.W.2d 640, 645-46 (Ky. 1940).
108. See PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.803(22).
109. See FLA. STAT. § 90.04 (1973) (both husband and wife are competent witnesses);
FLA. STAT. § 90.06 (1973) (atheists and agnostics are competent witnesses); FLA. STAT. §
90.08 (1973) (prior criminal conviction does not disqualify witness); cf. C. McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 61-71 (2d ed. 1972).
110. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1973) provides in part:
[N]o party to such action or proceeding, nor any person interested in the event
thereof, nor any person from, through or under whom any such party, or in-
terested person, derives any interest or title, by assignment or otherwise, shall
be examined as a witness in regard to any transaction or communication between
such witness and a person at the time of such examination deceased, insane or
lunatic, against the executor, or administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee,
legatee, devisee or survivor of such deceased person, or the assignee or committee
of such person or lunatic ....
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tent."'" The only class of witness that is specificially disqualified is
that covered by the proposed amendment to the Deadman's Statute." 2
Originally, the drafters of the Code felt that the Deadman's Statute
should be eliminated because its ultimate effect was to defeat legiti-
mate claims against an estate rather than to protect it against false
claims.113 The Code recognized the possibility of fraudulent claims
111. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.601.
112. See PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.602. The Code provision reads:
90.602 Testimony of interested persons.-
(1) No person interested in an action or proceeding against the personal rep-
resentative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of a deceased person
or the assignee, committee or guardian of an insane person shall be examined
as a witness regarding any oral communication between an interested person and
the person deceased or insane at the time of the examination.
(2) This section does not apply when:
(a) a personal representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor
of a deceased person or the assignee, committee or guardian of an insane person
is examined in his own behalf regarding the oral communication, or
(b) evidence of the subject matter of the oral communication is offered by
the personal representative, heir-at-law, assignee, legatee, devisee or survivor of a
deceased person or the assignee, committee or guardian of an insane person.
Any person who is either incapable of expressing himself so that he can be under-
stood or is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth is
specifically disqualified under § 90.603 of the Code. That section provides, however,
that an interpreter may be used so that the witness may be understood. In addition,
the witness, unless she qualifies as an expert, may testify only to matters about which
she has personal knowledge. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.604.
113. C. EHRHARTr, PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFr: EVIDENCE CODE, WrrmNssr § 601
(1974). The drafting committee agreed with the comments of the Florida Supreme
Court in Jackson v. Parker, 15 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1943):
[T]he provisions of this statute are entirely eliminated by the Model Code of
Evidence adopted last year by the American Law Institute. In this book there
is incorporated a valuable commentary by Mr. Mason Ladd on the changes wrought
by this code. As to exclusion [of] statutes of this nature, Mr. Ladd, among other
things, says: "In every jurisdiction where the statute now exists, there is a wide
range of hairsplitting distinctions opening the avenue for the survivor to testify.
The most common of these is overheard statements rather than direct communi-
cations. If disposed to falsify, the survivor may make out a case sufficient to sustain
a decision in spite of these statutes. The honest claimant suffers by being denied the
right to testify to personal communications and transactions. The honest rights
of the living are sacrificed in a vain effort to protect a dead man's estate from
false claims ....
But until the legislature sees fit to repeal or modify the rigors of this statute,
the courts must enforce it.
See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 65 (2d ed. 1972); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 578 (3d ed.
1940); 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 693 (1966). FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1973) reads in part: "No . . .
person interested . . . shall be examined as a witness . . . against the executor or ad-
ministrator .... ." Although it has been suggested that the statute is applicable only
when the executor or administrator is the defendant, see Ray, Deadman's Statutes, 24
Omo ST. L.J. 89, 94 (1963), the Florida courts have not adopted this interpretation but
have applied the statute when the executor is enforcing a claim. See Clark v. Grimsley,
1974]
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being filed against estates and included a specific provision that the
trier of fact was not bound by the uncontroverted testimony of a
claimant.114 Under this proposal the trier of fact would judge the
credibility of the witness and his testimony, and, if the witness was
not believed, deny a judgment solely based on this testimony. On the
other hand, if the testimony was credible and uncontroverted, judg-
ment for the claimant would be entered. An exception to the hearsay
rule would have been recognized so that statements by the decedent
concerning the claim could also be considered by the trier of fact;
that is, the executor of the estate could introduce statements made by
the decedent relating to the claim against the estate based on his
personal knowledge when the matter was recently perceived by him
and while his recollection was clear.115
At the last meeting of the Law Revision Council prior to submis-
sion of the Code to the Florida Legislature, it was decided to partially
reinstate the Deadman's Statute, limiting its application only to dis-
qualify testimony of an interested person regarding his oral communi-
cation with a decedent or lunatic in a claim against his estate. The
Code eliminates the existing statutory bar of testimony of an interested
person regarding "transactions" between him and the deceased. 116 The
inclusion of the transaction bar in the existing statute has led to un-
toward results. For example, in Stebnow v. Goss1 7 the plaintiff brought
suit against the administratrix of decedent's estate in order to recover
money allegedly loaned to the decedent. In an effort to establish the
indebtedness, plaintiff testified, over objection, that he was not indebted
to the decedent. He then placed into evidence, again over objection,
a number of cancelled checks drawn by the plaintiff payable to the
270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Broward Nat'l Bank v. Bear, 125 So. 2d
760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Thus, the statute is applicable when the evidence
is offered in an action involving the executor.
114. The drafters were concerned that unsubstantiated claims would be filed against
estates based on alleged oral promises and the claimant would move for a summary
judgment or a directed verdict on the basis that no testimony conflicting with his claim
had been introduced. An exception to the general rule, that unrebutted testimony must
be accepted as fact, see Rountree v. Davis, 167 So. 820, 824 (Fla. 1936); Bergh v. Bergh,
160 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964), was created by including, in a draft sub-
sequent to the Preliminary Working Draft, a provision that: "Uncorroborated testimony
of an interested person at the time of the action, deceased, or the assignee or committee
of a person at the time of the action insane or lunatic is not binding on the trier of
fact." This provision was eliminated when the Council decided to include the amended
Deadman's Statute. This view was recommended in Brooker, Let's Repeal the Dead Man
Act, 38 FLA. B.J. 181 (1964).
115. See C. EHRHARnT, PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT: EVIDENCE CODE, HEARSAY §
804(b)(2), at 68 (1974).
116. See PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.602.
117. 165 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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order of the decedent. The appellate court, in reversing the lower
court, held that plaintiff's testimony as to indebtedness to the decedent
at the time of the issuance of the checks was in contravention of the
Deadman's Statute, and that the checks could not, in and of them-
selves, establish an alleged indebtedness. A disinterested witness was
required.
Broward National Bank v. Bear118 involved the opposite factual
situation. There the executor brought suit to recover the principal
amount of defendant's note which decedent held. The defendant al-
leged payment of the note, testified on his own behalf and introduced
checks purporting to show payment to the decedent. Subsequently,
judgment was entered for the makers of the note, and the executor ap-
pealed claiming that admission of the defendant's testimony showing
payment of the note, and admission of the check violated the prohibi-
tion of the Deadman's Statute concerning testimony as to a "transac-
tion." In reversing, the appellate court held that "testimony of a
witness of the payment or non-payment of an obligation to a deceased
person concerns a transaction with him within the statute relating to
transactions with a deceased person, thereby rendering the testimony
incompetent."119
The result in situations such as Goss and Bear is that the surviving
party can make no use of his personal knowledge concerning the facts
and circumstances of the transaction. Any personal documents that
tend to prove or disprove the indebtedness, payment or nonpayment,
would also be excluded, as one cannot do indirectly that which he can-
not do directly." ° Thus, unless a disinterested witness existed who
could testify as to the circumstances of the obligation, the surviving
party is summarily precluded from establishing an action on the obli-
gation or a defense to it.
Under the proposed modification allowing testimony as to transac-
tions, the surviving party has an opportunity to establish by personal
documents and testimony the facts and circumstances surrounding the
obligation. The executor has an equal opportunity to establish the de-
cedent's side of the case by use of witnesses or personal documents, or
by implication from the lack of documents or proof of contact. Ulti-
mately, it is for the jury to decide which party has established the
better case. While a survivor may give some personal testimony under
the Code, he still is precluded from testifying as to "oral communica-
118. 125 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
119. Id. at 762.
120. 165 So. 2d at 254-55. See Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 20 MIAMi L. REV.
225, 241-42 n.108 (1965); McKenna, Negotiable Instruments, 16 MIAMI L. REV. 533, 534
(1962).
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tions."121 Thus, the plaintiff is given his day in court, while the estate
is protected by excluding fraudulent claims based on oral "promises"
of the decedent.
B. Competency of Jurors
Although the Florida courts have not ruled directly upon the
question, it is hoped that they would agree with the Code provision
that a juror is not a competent witness in the trial in which he is
sitting as a juror.122 Under existing law a juror may be challenged for
cause if he is to be a witness for either party during the trial. 23 The
unfairness of allowing a juror to testify and then to return to the box is
evident. 24 The Code also allows counsel to object out of the presence
of the jury to the calling of a juror as a witness,'125 so that counsel does
not prejudice his cause in the eyes of the remainder of the jury by
objecting to testimony of a fellow juror.
The Code does not establish the substantive grounds required to
set aside a jury verdict, but it does set forth the matters upon which
a member of the jury is incompetent to testify when a verdict is
challenged. 12 6 Presently, a juror is not competent to testify as to matters
that concern a juror's mind, emotions or beliefs. 2 7 As a result a juror
is not competent to testify as to his interpretation of the court's in-
structions to the jury. The finality of the jury verdict, the protection of
121. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.602.
122. Compare PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.607(3).
123. See FLA. STAT. § 913.03(11) (1973).
124. Regardless of the prejudice involved in the practice, at common law a juror
was allowed to testify and return to the jury box. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1910
(3d ed. 1940).
125. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.607(3)(a).
126. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.607(3)(b). This section is based on the 1969 Draft
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 606(b) (1969), which
was later amended in the version approved by the Supreme Court to render incompetent
any testimony regarding quotient verdicts. PROP. FED. R. EID. 606(b). The House of
Representatives amended the Proposed Rules to conform the original 1969 version.
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). For a similar provision see CAL. EVID. CODE §
1150 (West 1966).
127. See 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2349 (McNaughton rev. 1961). As the Florida
Supreme Court in McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 123 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. 1960), ex-
plained:
[T]he law does not permit a juror to avoid his verdict for any reason which es-
sentially inheres in the verdict itself, as that he "did not assent to the verdict; that
he misunderstood the instructions of the Court; the statements of the witnesses or
the pleadings in the case; that he was unduly influenced by the statements or other-
wise of his fellow-jurors, or mistaken in his calculations or judgment, or other
matter resting alone in the juror's breast."
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jurors from annoyance and embarrassment, and the jury's freedom of
deliberation are preserved.2 8 The Code retains the Florida rule that
"the law does not permit a juror to avoid his verdict for any reason
which essentially inheres in the verdict itself.' 129
Testimony by a juror concerning extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion that was incorrectly brought before the jury, or outside influences
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, is not made incompetent
by the Code. 30 Thus overt acts that are not inherent in the jury verdict
are competent subjects about which a juror may testify. For example,
if a juror were to testify that he voted for the verdict because of the
threats upon his family made by one of the parties to the proceeding,
such testimony would be competent.
IV. EXPERT TESTIMONY
When expert testimony is sought to be introduced, the Code pro-
visions include two sections'13 that follow the practices of the experts
themselves and eliminate much of the confusion from the use of the
hypothetical question.1 2 Generally, when an expert renders an opinion
in his testimony during a trial, present practice requires that it be
based on his personal knowledge or on facts propounded in a hypo-
thetical question; expert testimony may not be based upon out-of-court
opinions and statements of third persons.22 In contrast, when a
physician actually diagnoses a child's illness, he ordinarily relies, in
forming his opinion, not only upon his personal examination and the
statements of the child but also upon the statements of parents or
relatives. Additionally, he may rely upon the reports of other
128. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
129. McAllister Hotel, Inc. v. Porte, 123 So. 2d 339, 344 (Fla. 1960), See 53 IOWA L.
REV. 1366, 1367 (1968), listing the twelve states adopting this view and examples of the
various types of misconduct that do not inhere in the verdict.
130. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.607(3).
131. PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE §§ 90.704-05.
132. As Professor Wigmore stated in his treatise:
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has
in practice led to intolerable obstruction of truth. In the first place, it has
artificially clamped the mouth of the expert witness, so that his answer to a
complex question may not express his actual opinion on the actual case. This is
because the question may be so built up and contrived by counsel as to represent
only a partisan conclusion. In the second place, it has tended to mislead the jury
so as to the purport of actual expert opinion. This is due to the same reason. In
the third place, it has tended to confuse the jury, so that its employment becomes
a mere waste of time and a futile obstruction.
2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted).
133. See Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 14
(2d ed. 1972).
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physicians. Similarly, the Code permits an expert to give opinion
testimony at trial based upon facts that are of a type upon which ex-
perts in the field rely in forming their particular opinions on that sub-
ject. 3 4 Thus, the test for the basis of the expert's opinion is resolved
by the routine practice of experts in that field, rather than by the
exclusionary rules of evidence. If, for example, certain facts are con-
sidered and evaluated by an orthopedic surgeon in deciding what type
of treatment is necessary for a particular patient when the patient ap-
pears for treatment in the physician's office, the doctor should also be
able to rely upon those same facts when testifying in court.
The Code also recognizes that hypothetical questions are subject
to a great deal of valid criticism. As Dean Wigmore states: "The
hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever,
has in practice led to intolerable obstruction of truth."' 135 Section 90.705
of the Code18 permits an expert to testify not only by answering
hypothetical questions but also by giving his opinion without any dis-
closure of the underlying facts upon which it is based. Recently, the
Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. State permitted an expert to
state his opinion, based on his examination of a party, without first
stating the details of his investigation: "It is not necessary that the
134. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.704 provides:
Bases of opinion testimony by experts.-The facts or data in the particular case
upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by
or made known to him at or before the trial. If the facts or data are of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular subject to support the opinion
expressed, the facts or data need not be admissable in evidence.
For similar provisions see CAL. Evm. CODE § 801 (West 1966); PROP. FED. R. Evm. 703. C.
McCoRMICK, EvmarNcE § 15 (2d ed. 1972) and 3 J. WGMORE, EVDENCE § 688 (Chadbourn
rev. 1970) contain thorough discussions of the need for this rule.
135. 2 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 686 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted); see note 132
supra.
136. PROP. FLA. Ev. CODE § 90.705 states:
Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.-
(1) Unless otherwise required by the court, an expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inferences and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data. Upon cross-examination he shall be required to specify
the facts or data.
(2) Prior to the witness giving his opinion, a party against whom the opinion
or inference is offered may conduct a voir dire examination of the witness directed
to the underlying facts or data for his opinion. If the party establishes prima
facie evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the
opinions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering
the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.
In McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23
TExAs L. RPv. 109, 126 n.60 (1945), the author cites a case in which a hypothetical question
covered 83 pages of the reporter's transcript and the objection to it covered 14 pages.
157. 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974).
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expert state the detailed circumstances of the examination before
giving his finding. The facts and symptoms which he observed, and
on which he bases his opinion, may be brought out on cross-examina-
tion."'13 The Code extends this decision by permitting the facts to
be disclosed to the expert witness by counsel prior to his being called
to testify rather than reading a 30-minute hypothetical question to the
witness in the courtroom before the jury. To ensure that there is a
sufficient basis for the opinion, opposing counsel is permitted, upon
cross-examination, to inquire into the facts and data upon which the
expert based his opinion.13 9 By discovery and investigation, the op-
posing counsel should have the knowledge that is essential for an
effective cross-examination.
To prevent abuse of the practice of calling an alleged expert and
asking him to testify without requiring the hypothetical question, two
additional provisions are included in section 90.705. First, the court
retains discretion to disallow a particular expert's testimony without a
hypothetical question. 140 Secondly, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is being offered alleges that the expert does not have sufficient
basis for his testimony, the party has the right to conduct a voir dire
examination of the witness to challenge such basis prior to the expres-
sion of any expert opinion. This is done in order to determine what
facts and data the witness is using to form his opinion. If the cross-
examining party establishes prima facie evidence that the witness has
not based his opinion on sufficient facts, the burden is then placed
upon the offering party to establish the necessary facts and data which
underlie the opinion in order for the witness's testimony to be ad-
missible.14 1 It is envisioned that counsel will employ this voir dire
138. Id. at 727.
139. PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.705(1).
140. PROP. FLA. Evm. CODE § 90.705(1).
141. See PROP. FLA. EvID. CODE § 90.705(2). The drafters felt that the ability to
cross-examine the alleged expert was insufficient protection for the opposing party if
a completely unqualified "expert opinion" was already before the jury. The prejudice
that would result from the testimony could not then be cured by cross-examination or
court instruction. It was felt that the inclusion of the voir dire provision gives counsel
adequate protection. From the language of the Code it is not clear whether the voir dire
would take place in the jury's presence. Since the purpose of the voir dire is to deter-
mine whether there is an adequate basis for the expert's opinion, it is reasonable that
the admissibility of the testimony should be determined out of the jury's presence.
From opposing counsel's viewpoint, however, it would be beneficial to show, in the
jury's presence, the inadequacy of the opinion's foundation before it is expressed in
direct testimony. The author, as Reporter to the Council, intends to draw this potential
problem to the Council's attention before the Code is resubmitted to the legislature. A
provision similar to § 90.705(2) of the proposed Florida Code is not included in either
the California Code or the Proposed Federal Rules.
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provision, but only in the few cases where counsel is unfamiliar
with the substance of an expert witness's testimony. The Code takes
the position that if opposing counsel were required to wait until
cross-examination to attempt to attack the opinion testimony, nothing
done on cross-examination by counsel or by the court could eliminate
the prejudice that results from statement of the opinion before the
jury.
V. PRIVILEGES
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every man's
evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemp-
tion, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any
exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule .... 14
Since evidentiary privileges do not aid in the ascertainment of truth,
the Code recognizes only a limited number of privileged confidential
communications.143 The attorney-client,144 priest-penitent 45 and marital
privileges 14 are codified. The confidential communications protected
by the existing privileges between psychiatrist-patient 1 7 and psycholo-
gist-patient 148 have been combined into one privilege termed the
psychotherapist-patient privilege,1 4 1 and confidential communications
142. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
143. Wigmore has set forth the fundamental requisites that are generally recognized
as necessary for the establishment of a testimonial privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct dis-
posal of litigation.
Id. § 2285 (footnote omitted).
144. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.503.
145. See PROP. FLA. EviD. CODE § 90.506. This section is a substantial restatement of
existing FLA. STAT. § 90.241 (1973).
146. See PROP. FLA. EvwD. CODE § 90.505.
147. See FLA. STAT. § 90.242 (1973).
148. See FLA. STAT. § 490.32 (1973).
149. PROP. FLA. EVD. CODE § 90.504 states:
Psychotherapist-patient privilege.-
(1) For purposes of this chapter, the following definitions are applicable:
(a) A "psychotherapist" is:
1. A person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reason-
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made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment of a mental or emo-
tional condition are protected. The existing privilege is expanded from
psychiatrists and psychologists to include communications to all per-
sons authorized to practice medicine while engaged in such diagnosis
or treatment. Therefore, confidential communication to any medical
doctor engaged in the treatment of a mental or emotional condition
are privileged. In order to treat mental and emotional disorders, it is
necessary to persuade the patient to talk freely and reveal his problem.
ably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treat-
ment of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction; or
2. A person licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state
of [sic] nation, engaged primarily in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or
emotional condition, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.
(b) A "patient" is a person who consults or is interviewed by a psycho-
therapist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condi-
tion, including alcoholism and other drug addiction.
(c) A communication is "confidential" if it is not intended to be disclosed
to third persons other than:
1. Those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,
examination or interview; or
2. Those persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communica-
tion; or
3. Those persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under
the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(2) A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purpose of
diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including alcoholism
and other drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psycho-
therapist, including members of the patient's family.
(3) The privilege may be claimed by:
(a) The patient or his attorney,
(b) A guardian or conservator of the patient when the patient has a guardian
or conservator,
(c) The personal representative of a deceased patient,
(d) The psychotherapist at the time of the communication, but only in behalf
of the patient. The authority of a psychotherapist to claim the privilege is pre-
sumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(4) There is no privilege under this section:
(a) As to communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to compel
hospitalization of a patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course
of diagnosis or treatment has reasonable cause to believe the patient is in need of
hospitalization.
(b) As to communications made in the course of such a court-ordered
examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient.
(c) As to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional
condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition
as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any pro-
ceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim
or defense.
A similar provision is contained in PROt'. FED. R. EvIo. 504.
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Generally the patient must orally reveal his thoughts and feelings, and
he is less likely to do so if he is not confident they will be confidential.
The same justification exists for the privilege whether treatment is
provided by a psychiatrist, psychologist or medical doctor.
The Code does not provide for the existing accountant-client
privilege. 150 In eliminating the privilege, it was determined that the
injury to the public interest and administration of justice which re-
sults from the recognition of the privilege outweighs the benefits that
flow to the accountant-client relationship from the existence of the
privilege. The major policy supporting the privilege seems to be the
need to protect a client under investigation by the Internal Revenue
Service. 15 1 If this protection actually resulted from the privilege, per-
haps the Council would have recommended its retention. In Falsone
v. United States'15 2 however, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit refused to recognize Florida's existing accountant's
privilege in federal income tax investigations. The court found that
privileges in federal tax proceedings were questions of federal law,
which does not include an accountant-client privilege.' 53 The existence
of a state accountant-client privilege is irrelevant in federal tax matters
and the Code's failure to recognize the privilege will not further in-
hibit the full disclosure of information for the preparation of income
tax returns.1 "
150. The existing Florida statute establishing the privilege provides:
All communications between a certified public accountant or public accountant
and the person for whom such certified public accountant or public accountant
shall have made any audit or other investigation in a professional capacity, and
all information obtained by a certified public accountant and public accountant in
his professional capacity concerning the business and affairs of a client, shall be
deemed privileged communications in all of the courts of this state, and no such
certified public accountant or public accountant shall be permitted to testify with
respect to any of said matters, except with the consent in writing of such client
or his legal representative.
FLA. STAT. § 473.141 (1973). The accounting profession itself does not agree on the
desirability of a statutory privilege. See J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF
THE ACCOUNTIN PROFESSION § 78, at 134 (1966).
151. See 46 N.C.L. REv. 419, 424 (1968). See also Fahey, Testimonial Privilege of
Accountants in Federal Tax Fraud Investigations, 17 TAX L. REv. 491 (1962); Tigue,
Accountant-Client Communications, 12 TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 1 (1968); Note, Functional
Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implication for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1248 (1962).
152. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
153. For a discussion of other cases involving this issue, see Cohen, Accountants'
Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21 TAX L. REv. 183, 213-15 (1966).
154. It is in the public interest to ensure that taxes will be properly paid and that
tax fraud does not go unchecked-that the community as a whole is sharing fairly the
support of the government. If a person discloses to the accountant all relevant informa-
tion, his taxes will be fairly and honestly computed and paid. When the taxpayer un-
PROPOSED EVIDENCE CODE
A great deal of the accountant's responsibility to a client outside
the tax area is in the area of auditing and certification of the client's
financial statements that are used as the basis of dealing with the
company's potential and present creditors and shareholders. 1 55 Thus,
it is inherent in communications received from the client that they
will be used by the accountant as the basis of subsequent reports which
will be distributed to third persons. In addition, the accountant's code
of ethics requires that he disclose to the public any relevant material
that will prevent publication of a misleading financial statement.'
56
As opposed to the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient relation-
ships, in which the client and patient assume that the professional will
not reveal the substance of the communications, a client often knows
that, when he conveys information to an accountant, that information
might be subsequently disclosed.
Another argument for the retention of the privilege is that the
accountant may be compelled to disclose a client's trade secrets, learned
while rendering professional services. The Code's recognition of the
trade-secret privilege157 prevents such an occurrence. The dissemina-
tion, outside of the courtroom, of information concerning the client
is prevented by the accountant's own code of ethics. 5"
A fishing expedition into the affairs of a client during an ac-
countant's testimony is barred by the requirement that evidence be
relevant to the proceedings. 59 Moreover, many activities that might
be the source of courtroom inquiry-such as false entries or transfers
to defraud creditors-would be unethical actions on the part of the
accountant if he knowingly fails to disclose them and should not be
protected by a privilege. 60
If the accountant-client privilege is necessary to preserve the effec-
tive relationship between an accountant and client, the rendition of
an accountant's services should be demonstratably less efficient in that
majority of states where the privilege is not recognized than in the
intentionally fails to disclose some information, payment of a deficiency will, in most
instances, end the matter. If he fails intentionally to disclose information, such an
instance is not in the public interest as it would assist in perpetrating a tax fraud.
See 46 N.C.L. REv. 419 (1968).
155. See id.
156. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS rule 2.02; J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE
ACCOUNTING PROFESSION §§ 43, 46 (1966).
157. See PROP. FLA. EvED. CODE § 90.507.
158. See J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE ACCOUNTING PRO-
FESSION § 76 (1966).
159. See PROP. FLA. EVID. CODE § 90.401.
160. See J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE ACCOUNTINC PRO-
FESSION §§ 46, 80 (1966).
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fifteen states where the privilege presently exists. 161 Since there ap-
parently has been no such demonstration of harm when the privilege is
not recognized, it seems that the administration of justice and the public
interest in ascertaining the truth outweigh the benefits to the ac-
countant-client relationship that flow from recognition of the privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
While this article has dealt with only a few highlights of the Code,
there are additional provisions which are in themselves important.
Many restate existing law concerning evidentiary rules that are not
controversial. Others represent change in areas in which the general
interest is not as great as in those sections discussed. The drafting of
the Code is a significant undertaking and disagreement with a few
of its sections should not serve as a barrier to the benefits of uniformity
and clarity that would flow from its adoption. If there is objection to
particular sections, an attempt should be made by the objectors to
improve those sections rather than to oppose the Code in its entirety.
If frequent legislative tampering with the Code is feared, it should
be rembered that several statutes dealing with isolated evidentiary
matters have existed in Florida for a number of years6 2 and the legis-
lature has not amended them often. Moreover, the problem has not
arisen in California, New Jersey and Kansas-the three states with
the most experience with evidence codification. Although there has
been much study and discussion of the Code during the past year,
these deliberations should continue in order to ensure that the product
presented to, and hopefully adopted by, the Florida Legislature will
represent a sound codification of evidence law that will aid both the
Florida bench and bar.
161. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania and
Tennessee. Puerto Rico also recognizes the accountant-client privilege. For discussion
of the relevant provisions of each state statute see Note, Privileged Communications-
Accountants and Accounting-A Critical Analysis of Accountant-Client Statutes, 66 MICH.
L. REv. 1264 (1968).
162. See FLA. STAT. chs. 90, 92 (1973).
